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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the statute conferring emergency rate making
authority upon the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio was seldom
applied. Though it has been part of Ohio law in substantially the same
form for sixty-five years, the Ohio supreme court has considered its
provisions only a few times, and most of the cases were decided in
the period between 1920 and 1948. During the past several decades,
until 1973, the Commission was not even requested to invoke its
emergency authority except as a vehicle for rescuing small utilities
which had delayed too long in assessing and updating their financial
programs. Throughout the late 1950's and 1960's the larger utilities
had no reason to request emergency relief-their budgets reflected
record profits, five of them enjoyed top bond ratings, and economies
of scale achieved by building large facilities resulted in decreasing
electric rates.
However, the double-digit inflation of the 1970's created ex-
traordinary financial pressures upon Ohio's electric companies.
Caught between rising operating costs on one hand, and increased
demands for service on the other, those companies have found it more
difficult to attract capital needed to provide expanded service, or even
maintain existing service. They have therefore requested and received
temporary authority to increase rates. The statute under which the
commission may grant such emergency relief is § 4909.16 of the Ohio
Revised Code,1 commonly known as the emergency statute. Under
prevailing economic conditions, this section will remain an important
legal tool. This article is intended as a guide to present law and policy
related to the emergency statute. It offers an analysis of the Ohio
supreme court's interpretation of § 4909.16, an indication of the prob-
able limits of the Commission's jurisdiction under the statute and
case law, an examination of Commission practices under the statute,
* Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The views expressed herein do not
necessarily represent the official position of the Commission. The author expresses deep appre-
ciation to Samuel Price, second year law student at The Ohio State University, College of Law,
for his invaluable assistance in research, drafting, editing and preparation of this article.
I All references are to the Ohio Revised Code unless specified otherwise.
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and a summary of recent applications of the statute by the Commis-
sion.
II. JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY UNDER THE STATUTE
The emergency statute was enacted as § 4 of the Public Utilities
Act of 1911,2 and was first codified as § 614-32 of the General Code.
In 1953, the legislature revised the wording for stylistic purposes
when it recodified the statute as § 4909.16 of the Ohio Revised Code;
however, the present version remains identical in substance with the
original enactment. The statute now reads:
[wihen the public utilities commission deems it necessary to prevent
injury to the business or interests of the public or of any public
utility of this state in case of any emergency to be judged by the
commission, it may temporarily alter, amend, or, with the consent
of the public utility concerned, suspend any existing rates, sched-
ules, or order relating to or affecting any public utility or part of
any public utility in this state. Rates so made by the commission
shall apply to one or more of the public utilities in this state or to
any portion thereof, as is directed by the commission, and shall take
effect at such time and remain in force for such length of time as
the commission prescribes.
The language of the statute places only the most general limita-
tions on the Commission's discretion in determining what circum-
stances justify an emergency order. Circumstances must be such that,
in the Commission's judgment, some injury to the business or inter-
ests of the public or of a public utility will result unless the Commis-
sion acts. Some would argue that dictum from the concurring opinion
of Chief Justice Marshall in City of Columbus v. PUCO4 limits the
Commission's power to find an emergency based on a company's
I Public Utilities Act § 34, 102 Laws of Ohio 549, 559 (1911).
3 As originally enacted the statute reads:
The commission shall have power, when deemed by it necessary to prevent
injury to the business or interests of the public or any public utility of this state in
case of any emergency to be judged by the commission, to temporarily alter, amend,
or with the consent of the public utility concerned suspend any existing rates, sched-
ules or order relating to or affecting any public utility or part of any public utility in
this state. Such rates so made by the commission shall apply to one or more of the
public utilities in this state or to any portion thereof as may be directed by the
commission, and shall take effect at such time and remain in force for such length
of time as may be prescribed by the commission.
Id.
103 Ohio St. 79, 133 N.E. 800 (1921).
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inability to meet its operating expenses. That case, however, was
decided without a majority opinion, and in fact, the supreme court
has always upheld the Commission when its finding of emergency was
the crux of the case.
For example, in Manufacturers Light & Heat Co. v. PUCO, the
Commission granted an emergency rate increase because the utility
company's financial data showed that its revenues were insufficient
to cover operating expenses. However, after further hearings four
months later, the Commission rescinded its order on grounds that the
company had failed to show that the emergency still existed. The
company appealed, arguing that the evidence of record would not
support rescission of the emergency order, but the supreme court
affirmed without considering the adequacy of the record. The court
held that "[u]nder the provisions of [§ 4909.16] the determination of
whether an emergency exists, warranting a temporary alteration of
rates, and the length of time such altered rates shall remain in effect
are within the judgment and sound discretion of the Public Utilities
Commission."' This holding is based on the court's earlier decision
in City of Cambridge v. PUCO.7 In that case the court held, as in
Manufacturers, that the determination of an emergency lies within
the sound discretion of the Commission, and that the Commission's
own regulatory lag and the inability of a utility company to pay its
fixed charges were factors upon which the Commission could reason-
ably base a finding of emergency.8
III. EMERGENCY JURISDICTION OVER MUNICIPAL UTILITY RATES
The Commission's emergency jurisdiction is limited in respect to
utility rates established by municipal corporations, but the cases do
not precisely define the limitation. The supreme court has held that
in some circumstances the Commission may temporarily alter the
terms of utility contracts between municipal corporations and utility
companies, but it remains undecided whether the power to make such
alterations may be applied to the utility rates. To describe the limita-
tion as clearly as the cases allow requires a brief overview of the
various authorities granting regulatory powers to the cities.
The General Assembly first gave the cities unilateral rate mak-
163 Ohio St. 78, 125 N.E.2d 183 (1955).
Id. at 80, 125 N.E.2d at 184-85.
7 159 Ohio St. 88, I11 N.E.2d 1 (1953).
1 Accord, City of Jackson v. PUCO, 159 Ohio St. 123, 111 N.E.2d 7 (1953).
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ing powers by the Act of March 11, 1853,1 which authorized city
councils to fix rates for natural gas service. As amended, the statute
(now § 743.26) also grants authority to fix electric and water rates.
The Act of April 5, 1854,10 provides that if an electric company or
gas company assents in writing to a regulatory ordinance, the city
may not require the company to furnish service at rates lower than
the ones specified in the ordinance "during the period of time agreed
on," not to exceed ten years. The supreme court has held that the
company's assent, given pursuant to this section, creates a contract
between it and the municipal corporation." The Act of April 20,
190412 empowers cities to grant the use of their public ways to hot
water and steam heating companies for laying conduits, and to regu-
late rates for hot water and steam heat. By 1911 utility service had
grown into a matter of more than local concern, and the General
Assembly passed the Public Utilities Act, 3 which established the
Ohio Public Service Commission (superseded two years later by the
Public Utilities Commission)," and which included the original ver-
sion of § 4909.16. The same act, however, included a section to
protect existing municipal regulatory powers from encroachment by
the newly established state commission. 5 That section is now codified
as § 4909.40, which reads as follows:
Chapters 4901., 4903., 4905., 4907., 4909., 4921., 4923., and
4925. of the Revised Code do not apply to any rate, fare, or regula-
tion prescribed by any municipal corporation granting a right, per-
mission, authority, or franchise to use its streets, alleys, avenues, or
public places for street railway purposes, or to any prices so fixed
under sections 715.34, 743.26, and 743.28 of the Revised Code,
except as provided in sections 4909.34, 4909.35, 4909.36, 4909.38,
and 4909.39 of the Revised Code [emphasis supplied]."
51 Laws of Ohio 360, 373 (1853).
' 52 Laws of Ohio 30 (1854) (now § 743.28).
" Ohio River Power Co. v. City of Steubenville, 99 Ohio St. 421, 124 N.E. 246 (1919).
2 97 Laws of Ohio 504, 507 (1904) (now § 715.34).
'3 102 Laws of Ohio 549 (1911).
14103 Laws of Ohio 804 (1913).
" Public Utilities Act § 49, 102 Laws of Ohio 549, 563 (1911).
" For purposes of this discussion, §§ 4909.34, 4909.35, 4909.36, 4909.38, and 4909.39,
referred to in § 4909.40, may be summarized as follows. At any time within one year before
the expiration of an existing contract made between a city and a gas or electric company
pursuant to §§ 715.34, 743.26 and 743.28, the city may enact a new ordinance to fix a new rate
for an ensuing period, pursuant to the same sections of Title 7. Within sixty days after passage
of such an ordinance, the company affected may complain to the Commission. By filing its
complaint the company agrees to continue serving the public during the term of the ordinance
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In addition to the power to regulate utility rates unilaterally, the
cities also have the power to contract for utility service. They may
make contracts for gas or electric service under the Act of May 14,
1878,17 and for gas and water service under the Act of May 1, 1852.11
Finally, the cities have express constitutional authority to contract for
all utility services under Article XVIII, § 4 of the Ohio Constitution,
adopted in 1912. That section provides as follows:
Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate
within or without its corporate limits, any public utility the product
or service of which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its
inhabitants, and may contract with others for any such product or
service. The acquisition of any such public utility may be by con-
demnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the
use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any company
or person supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service
or product of any such utility.
The supreme court has limited the Commission's power to review the
contracts between municipal corporations and utility companies upon
constitutional grounds. In Link v. PUCO,19 the city of Cleveland
passed an ordinance setting a rate for steam heating service, and the
company assented to the rate. A group of citizens then petitioned the
Commission to investigate the reasonableness of the rate pursuant to
what is now § 4909.36. Although § 4909.36 is one of the sections
exempted from the restriction imposed by § 4909.40, the Commission
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The citizens appealed,
and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the statute authorizing
the petition was inconsistent with Article XVIII, Section 4 of the
state constitution, that the company's assent to the rate fixing ordi-
nance had created a contract protected by that section, and that the
Commission therefore has no jurisdiction to review the rates set in
the contract.
complained of. The newly enacted rate takes effect notwithstanding the company's complaint,
unless the company chooses to continue charging the same rate as under the expiring contract.
If the Commission finds that the new ordinance would be unfair or unreasonable or would
provide the company with insufficient compensation for its service, then it must fix a just and
reasonable rate to remain in effect for two years or for the time of the new ordinance, whichever
period is longer. Otherwise the Commission may confirm the rate fixed by the ordinance. A
water company may petition the Commission to fix a rate for water service within a municipal
corporation if the city fails to enact a new rate within sixty days after the expiration of the
rate fixing ordinance under which the company had been serving.
'7 75 Laws of Ohio 161, 354-58 (1878) (now § 743.38).
" 50 Laws of Ohio 274, 290 (1852) (now § 4933.04).
" 102 Ohio St. 336, 131 N.E. 796 (1921).
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In City of Akron v. PUCO (Akron I), ° the city passed an ordi-
nance to fix a natural gas rate, and the gas company accepted. Later
the city asked the Commission to act under the emergency statute to
set a lower rate, alleging "an emergency due to the depression." On
the company's motion the Commission dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion, and again the supreme court affirmed, citing Link. The opinion
implies that the holding rests not only on Article XVIII, Section 4
of the state constitution, but also on Article II, Section 28, which
forbids impairment of the obligation of contracts."
Thus, the limitation on the Commission's emergency powers, as
applicable to the alteration of municipal utility rates, is partly statu-
tory and partly constitutional. The statutory limitation precludes al-
teration of prices fixed for natural gas, electricity, water, hot water
or steam heat pursuant to §§ 715.34, 743.26 and 743.28. The constitu-
tional limitation, when applicable, precludes alteration of contracts
generally.
In City of Akron v. PUCO (Akron 11)22 however, the supreme
court held that the constitutional limitations will not prevent the
temporary alteration of express contract terms pursuant to the emer-
gency statute where such alterations are essential to the public
health and welfare. Akron H embodies the supreme court's broad-
est construction of the Commission's emergency powers. In that
case, the Commission held a hearing after giving notice to every
incorporated municipality and every natural gas company in the
state to investigate the adequacy of the state's natural gas supply.
It found that projected increased use of natural gas for heating
purposes, which would exceed the companies' ability to meet the
demand, would create a gas shortage for the next winter. The
Commission, relying on the emergency statute, issued an order
temporarily prohibiting any gas company from supplying newly in-
stalled space-heating equipment. The city of Akron appealed the
Commission's order. On appeal, the city stipulated that the record
126 Ohio St. 333, 185 N.E. 415 (1933).
2I Id. at 337, 185 N.E. at 416: "[T]he state cannot extend its police powers . . . so as to
interfere with vested contract rights."
Article II, Section 28 provides:
The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing
the obligation of contracts; but may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into
effect, upon such terms as shall be just and equitable, the manifest intention of
parties, and officers, by curing omissions, defects, and errors, in instruments and
proceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this state.
22 149 Ohio St. 347, 78 N.E.2d 890 (1948).
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supported the findings and order, that the state's natural gas supply
would probably be inadequate to meet the coming winter's demand,
and that the order was reasonable and necessary as an emergency
measure to protect the public health, safety and welfare. The only
issue on appeal was the city's contention that insofar as the order
purported to alter service connection regulations established by con-
tract between the city and the gas company, the order violated Article
XVIII, Section 4 of the state constitution and the contract clauses
of both state and federal constitutions. The court affirmed the Com-
mission's order. It held that where the parties, one a municipal corpo-
ration and one a utility company, were both entities created for public
purposes, and where their contract affected the public welfare, their
contract must be construed as including all legislative regulations
later adopted as essential to the health, safety and welfare of the
people. Therefore, no constitutional bar to its enforcement existed
where the appellant conceded that it was a necessary measure for
dealing with a state-wide emergency.23
Whether, in an emergency of similar exigency and scope, the
commission may alter the price terms of municipal utility contracts
remains undecided. Dicta in City of Cincinnati v. PUCO may be read
as supporting the position that § 4909.40 prohibits the Commission
from altering rates fixed by municipal ordinance for any type of
utility company specified in §§ 715.34, 743.26, or 743.28, regardless
of whether the company has accepted the ordinance so as to create a
contract.24 The supreme court, however, has more consistently taken
21 The Akron H case is important in another respect. A long line of cases holds that the
Commission is the legislature's creature and may exercise no powers except those delegated
by statute. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. PUCO, 35 Ohio St. 2d 97, 298 N.E.2d 587 (1973).
Nevertheless the necessary logical implication of the holding in Akron H is that under the
emergency statute the Commission has at its disposal implied powers not expressly conferred.
The statute expressly empowers the Commission to "alter, amend, or, with the consent of the
utility concerned, suspend any existing rates, schedules, or order relating to or affecting any
public utility or part of any public utility in this state." Relying -on the word order, the
Commission clearly may alter temporarily any of a utility's rules and regulations which it has
previously approved. But the Commission's order affirmed in Akron II uniformly affected the
service-connection regulations of every gas company in the state, and the court never even
considered whether the regulations thus affected were the subject of an "existing-order." More-
over, of all the regulations affected by the Commission's order, those which had been estab-
lished by contracts between gas companies and municipalities could not possibly have been the
subject of existing orders, except for regulations which perhaps had come before the Commis-
sion under §§ 4909.34, 4909.35, 4909.36, 4909.38 and 4909.39. In Akron II, therefore, the
court's holding clearly recognizes that the Commission's jurisdiction under the emergency
statute is broader than the power which the statute confers by its express terms.
21 149 Ohio St. 570, 80 N.E.2d 150 (1948). In that case a gas company complained to the
Commission under what is now § 4909.34 against a newly enacted regulatory ordinance which
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the position that the company's assent to a regulatory rate takes the
rate out of the purely regulatory realm, in which § 4909.40 limits the
Commission's emergency powers. Instead, the assent creates a con-
tract, and the Commission's actions are governed by constitutional
limitations and Akron II. For example, in Akron I, cited with ap-
proval in the Cincinnati case, the appellee urged the court to affirm
the Commission's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
§ 614-47 (now § 4909.40) prohibited the Commission from altering
the municipal contract rate, but the court said "section 614-47 is of
no help in this case as we view it. It is simply a reiteration of the spirit
of the Constitution." And again, "[i]f a public utility agrees to furnish
its product to the municipality at the regulatory rate, and there is a
meeting of the minds and an acceptance, then the regulatory rate
becomes [the] contract rate," and was therefore unreviewable on
purely constitutional grounds.2 Likewise, in Akron H, without men-
tioning the city's statutory power to regulate rates, the court stated
that the contracts between the city and the company had been made
"by virture of authority conferred by Section 4, Article XVIII of the
State Constitution. '2 6 This dicta from Akron II is consistent with the
first proposition of the syllabus in Link, which states:
Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, is self-executing
and no action of the legislature is essential to empower a
municipality and a public utility company to enter into a valid
contract for the product or service of such utility company to be
supplied to the municipality and its inhabitants?
it did not accept, because the new rate was lower than the old. While the complaint was pending,
the old rate continued in effect, beyond the expiration of the old ordinance, by operation of
what is now § 4909.38. The company asked the Commission to increase that rate pursuant to
the emergency statute, alleging financial difficulties. The Commission granted a temporary
emergency rate increase, and the city appealed, arguing that what is now § 4909.40 denied the
Commission jurisdiction. The court affirmed the Commission, holding that the interim rate was
an existing rate fixed by operation of law, and not by a subsisting ordinance, and that it
therefore lay outside the protection of § 4909.40. The court's holding expressly overrules City
of Cleveland v. PUCO, 126 Ohio St. 91, 183 N.E. 924 (1932), thereby settling an old dispute
as to whether such an interim rate is an "existing rate" within the terms of the emergency
statute.
In the dictum referred to the court states that "[s]ection [4909.40] prevails and precludes
the commission from exercising jurisdiction where there is a valid and operative ordinance
under which a utility is furnishing its products or services to users within the municipality
. 149 Ohio St. at 574, 80 N.E.2d at 152.
" 126 Ohio St. 333, 337, 185 N.E. 415, 416 (1932).
26 149 Ohio St. 347, 353, 78 N.E.2d 890, 894 (1948).
102 Ohio St. 336, 131 N.E. 796 (1921). See also Phelps v. Logan Natural Gas & Fuel
Co., 101 Ohio St. 145, 128 N.E. 58 (1920); cf. Ohio River Power Co. v. City of Steubenville,
99 Ohio St. 421, 124 N.E. 246 (1919).
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These precedents, taken together, suggest two conclusions. First,
once a utility company accepts the terms of a municipal ordinance,
the rate is no longer a regulatory one "fixed under sections 715.34,
743.26, and 743.28 of the Revised Code," but is rather a rate fixed
pursuant to the city's constitutional contractual powers. Second, such
a rate therefore lies outside the protection of § 4909.40 and is suscep-
tible to temporary alteration by the Commission pursuant to the
emergency statute, on the authority of Akron II and within its limita-
tions.
The issue of the scope of the Commission's emergency powers
relative to municipal utility rate has lain dormant since Akron II in
1948. However, it remains an important consideration for the Com-
mission to reckon with in fashioning regulatory policies in matters of
state-wide concern requiring orders of uniform application. The issue
may well arise, for example, in connection with the commission's
presently effective orders for emergency curtailment of natural gas
service, some of which are now on appeal before the supreme court.2
On the other hand, the issue has not presented difficulty in dealing
with the financial problems of particular utilities, because most mu-
nicipal ordinance contracts include provisions for termination by ei-
ther party upon specified notice.
IV. POLICY AND PRACTICES UNDER THE EMERGENCY STATUTE
From its diverse experience in administering the emergency stat-
ute, the Commission has developed certain broad policies to govern
its consideration of emergency rate requests. In four emergency or-
ders issued during the 1950's, the Commission granted emergency
rate increases based on findings of rate base and rate of return,
without making the extensive investigation and property valuation
that would have been required if the application had been filed under
21 Ohio Bakers Ass'n. v. PUCO, Ohio supreme court Docket No. 75-493 (filed June 3,
1975); Ohio Mfrs. Assn. v. PUCO, Ohio supreme court Docket No. 75-435 (filed May 20,
1975); Ohio Mfrs. Assn. v. PUCO, Ohio supreme court Docket No. 75-971 (filed Oct. 14,
1975).
As this article went to press, the supreme court issued its decision in Docket Nos. 75-435
and 75-493, consolidated sub. nom. Ohio Mfrs. Assn. v. PUCO, 45 Ohio St. 2d 86, 341 N.E.2d
585 (1976). The appellants contended that the authority of the commission under § 4909.16 to
issue orders with regard to energy emergencies was pre-empted by the legislation creating the
temporary Energy Emergency Commission, which was granted overlapping authority, and that
§ 4909.16 was repealed by implication. The court ruled that the contention was baseless, that
the authority was hierarchical, and that there was no basis for the claim of repeal by implica-
tion. The PUCO's orders in both cases were affirmed.
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the regular rate-making statutes. In the first of the four cases, the
Commission granted higher natural gas rates on the sole ground that
the applicant's present rate of return was inadequate and would fur-
ther diminish with an expected increase in the wholesale price of gasY.2
This is the only case in which the Commission ever found an emer-
gency consisting solely of an inadequate rate of return; the other three
similar decisions include a boilerplate finding "[t]hat from the evi-
dence adduced at said hearing the Commission finds that the rates
presently in effect provide a wholly inadequate rate of return, which
will not provide sufficient revenue to enable Applicant to render rea-
sonably adequate service at a reasonable cost."3 With the inclusion
of this finding, these three orders ostensibly satisfy the statutory
criterion that emergency relief must be found "necessary to prevent
injury to the business of interests of the public or of [a] public utility."
Even so, the language of these decisions suggests that the deciding
factor in each case was the applicant's percentage rate of return, and
in that respect these cases are exceptional.
The Commission's policy, firmly established in later cases, has
been to stress the differences between emergency rate proceedings
and permanent rate cases. In a permanent rate case the applicant's
rate of return is the main issue, and the Commission has to determine
that issue according to the procedures specified in the regular rate
making statutes. The central issue in an emergency case, on the other
hand, is not rate of return, but how to protect the applicant from the
injurious effects of its particular financial circumstances, so that its
ability to provide adequate service will not be impaired. 1
Until the last few years most emergency rate applications came
from small utility companies staffed with a handful of employees and
serving at most a few hundred customers. Generally, the applicant
had simply waited too long to file for a permanent rate increase and
' Lake County Gas Co., PUCO Case No. 24,030 (Aug. 3, 1953).
'* Natural Gas Co. of W. Va. at 1, PUCO Case No. 24,225 (Mar. 30, 1954); Natural
Gas Co. of W. Va. at 2, PUCO Case No. 24,227 (Mar. 30, 1954); Manufacturers' Light &
Heat Co. at 2, PUCO Case No. 24,334 (Feb. 9, 1954). The finding in Case No, 24,225 supra
was "wholly inadequate revenues" instead of "a wholly inadequate rate of return."
11 See, e.g., Ottoville Mutual Tel. Co., PUCO Case No. 73-356-Y at 4 (Nov. 13, 1973).
The Commission stated:
Before embarking on a discussion of the applicant's theory, the Commission notes
that because the terms "rate base" and "rate of return" have very precise statutory
meanings, such issues are properly considered in an application for a permanent rate
increase filed pursuant to Section 4909.18 Revised Code and, as a general rule, have
no place in the emergency case.
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had suddenly found itself unable to pay its fixed charges, or even to
pay its operating costs. The Commission's policy in such cases has
always been to keep the applicant on its feet during the pendency of
its permanent rate case by granting emergency rates high enough to
stave off an operating deficit and allow it to pay the interest on its
debt.32 Where emergency cases have been brought by small mutual
telephone companies, owned by the customers who had voted to
apply for increased rates, the Commission has granted the applica-
tions in full,33 or has reserved only minor issues to be heard in the
concurrent permanent cases.34 On the other hand, the Commission
has denied relief where the applicant's accounting procedures had
produced a paper deficit,35 where the period of time to which the
applicant's financial evidence related was unrepresentative of the
applicant's operations in general," where the evidence of record
simply did not show that the applicant would be operating at a loss, 37
or where the applicant had requested emergency rates for the admit-
ted purpose of recouping the losses it had incurred in a particularly
bad year .3 The Commission has also ruled that no emergency ex-
isted where the prospect of an operating deficit had arisen because
the applicant's parent company had decided not to continue subsidiz-
ing the applicant's operations.39
The emergency application of the Ottoville Mutual Telephone
Company in 1973 presented typical emergency circumstances.,' The
applicant was a small rural telephone company that served about 750
customers in northwestern Ohio under tariff rates that had been in
force for fourteen years. Historically, the company's capital structure
had been based on membership fees paid by the customer. In 1968
the management polled its subscribers and found that they favored a
comprehensive service upgrade that would provide all customers with
32 Madison Water Works, Inc., PUCO Case No. 74-721-WW-AEN (Mar. 5, 1975);
Minford Tel. Co., PUCO Case No. 72-800-Y (Feb. 23, 1973); Forest Hills Util. Co., PUCO
Case No. 36,771-A (Sept. 29, 1970).
11 Farmers Mut. Tel. Co., PUCO Case No. 74-648-Y(E) (Feb. 21, 1975); Arthur Mut.
Tel. Co., PUCO Case No. 73-568-Y (Dec. 1I, 1973); Ottoville Mut. Tel. Co., PUCO Case
No. 73-356-Y (Nov. 13, 1973).
Bascom Mut. Tel. Co., PUCO Case No. 74-240-Y (July 15, 1974).
Harbor Hills Serv. Co., PUCO Case No. 75-30-WW-AEM (May 9, 1975); Madison
Waterworks, Inc., PUCO Case No. 30,563 (Feb. 20, 1962).
36 Howard Antle and Gene Fitch, dba Burr Oak Serv. Co., PUCO Case No. 74-317-Y
(Mar. 12, 1975).
1 Chocktaw Util. Inc., PUCO Case No. 74-87-Y(E) (June 7, 1974).
1 Brimfield Water Co., PUCO Case No. 73-63 1-Y (Dec. 14, 1973).
Valley Util. Co., PUCO Case No. 73-207-Y (Aug. 17, 1973).
40 Ottoville Mut. Tel. Co., PUCO Case No. 73-356-Y (Nov. 13, 1973).
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single-party service. Thereupon the company obtained a $410,500
loan from the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) and began
a construction program. In 1969 the management applied to the
Commission for a permanent rate increase, but when it became ap-
parent that much of the new construction would not be completed in
time to be considered in the company's permanent rate case, the
management withdrew its application. In 1971, while still operating
under rates set in 1959, the company began to feel the grave effects
of increased costs which were directly attributable to the capital in-
vestment required to upgrade service. These included increased taxes,
increased labor and maintenance costs, and the cost of the debt which
the company had assumed under its REA loan. These costs had
severely weakened the applicant's financial position. In both 1971
and 1972 the applicant suffered net losses. In 1972 the company tried
to extricate itself from these difficulties by borrowing an additional
$109,500 from the REA, but the company's pro forma operating
statement showed that it would suffer another loss of about $20,000
in 1973. Realizing the company's inability to meet its operating ex-
penses and interest charges, and that its credit would probably be
impaired, the management filed concurrent applications for emer-
gency rate relief and for a permanent rate increase. In its emergency
application the company asked only for an increase sufficient to pro-
vide it with funds to pay for its operating expenses and the interest
on its loans until its permanent rate application could be decided. The
Commission granted the application.
In so doing the commission laid down standards which it has
consistently followed in subsequent requests for emergency rate re-
lief. First, the Commission noted that in an emergency case the com-
mission's staff does not make its own independent investigation of the
applicant's financial position as it does in permanent rate cases. In
the absence of such an independent analysis, the evidence submitted
by the applicant must "clearly and convincingly demonstrate that a
situation exists which warrants an exercise of the Commission's
emergency powers." Second, the Commission said that emergency
relief is a remedy "extraordinary in nature," and restated its long
standing policy that emergency increases should be granted only
when such relief "is the only reasonably practical mechanism avail-
able to prevent injury to the applicant utility's business and to the
public interest." Third, the Commission warned that it would not
permit the emergency statute to become a vehicle for circumventing
the regular rate making procedures established by § 4909.18 and that
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it would "look askance at emergency applications which request the
identical relief sought in a [concurrently filed] permanent application
... " To protect the integrity of the rate-making process, the Com-
mission said it would "fix the amount of temporary relief at the
minimum level which, under the exigent circumstances constituting
the emergency, will avert the impending injury to the interests of the
applicant and of the public."'"
The first large utility in recent years to be granted emergency
rates was United Telephone Company of Ohio." The circumstances
leading to the decision are unique to the company but the facts upon
which the Commission based its finding of an emergency served to
pave the way for subsequent applications filed by major electric com-
panies. United's precarious financial position developed from its 1968
merger with eight small independent telephone companies, after
which the company had set about improving and extending its service
with the goal of providing one-party service to all its customers. To
finance necessary construction and the replacement of outdated
equipment, the company had issued four bond series between 1969
and 1972 under indentures requiring that the company maintain a net
income equal to two times the total annual interest on its outstanding
bonds.
The Commission had set rates for United in 1970, but in 1971
the company had filed under the emergency statute for an increase,
alleging that the existing rates would not yield the revenues that the
Commission had found to be reasonable a year earlier. The Commis-
sion denied the emergency application but reopened the 1970 case to
reconsider its decision. After a hearing, the Commission issued an
order two years later that left the 1970 decision undisturbed. Five
days after this decision United filed a new emergency application,
alleging that rising costs had eroded its earnings in 1971 to 1973 to
the point that its net income no longer met the requirements of the
company's outstanding bond indentures. Without emergency rate re-
lief, the company would be unable to issue additional bonds in order
to raise capital for necessary construction and upgraded service.
Moreover, its bond rating would probably decline, leading to higher
interest rates on long-term debt and a higher rate of return on its
invested capital. The increased cost of capital would have to be
charged to the customers, but the resulting revenues would simply be
' Id., at 2-3.
42 United Tel. of Ohio, PUCO Case iqo. 73-178-Y (Aug. 1, 1973).
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absorbed in the increased cost of financing rather than being utilized
to improve services. Under these circumstances, although the com-
pany had never sustained a deficit, its financial condition was still so
unfavorable that injury to its business and impairment of its ability
to serve the public would result unless the Commission acted. The
Commission approved an emergency rate increase, reasoning that
"[i]f the public must, in any case, pay a higher price for applicant's
services, the increase should be imposed now, so that it can support
the additional financing which, in turn, will provide the customers
with better service for their money."43 In granting the company's
application, the Commission followed the policy that was restated in
the Ottoville order. It limited relief to "the minimum amount which,
under the exigent circumstances constituting the emergency, will
avert the impending injury to the interests of applicant and of the
public."" Accordingly, the Commission subtracted from the total
additional revenues requested the amount United expected to pay in
dividends to its parent company, and allowed United to collect the
difference through increased rates.
In 1974, a year after the United decision, unprecedented infla-
tion spawned emergency requests from six of the seven major Ohio
electric companies. In the five cases in which emergency relief was
granted,45 the financial circumstances resembled those of United. In
each case inflationary costs had deeply eroded the applicant's net
earnings until the company could no longer issue new bonds to fi-
nance essential maintenance and construction or to convert existing
short term debt to long-term debt. One company's bond rating had
already been down-graded and the ratings of the others were due to
be reviewed. In each case, the applicant had already pared planned
construction to the minimum and alleged that service interruptions
would become longer and more frequent. The Ohio Power Company
stated that unless it proceeded with its minimum construction pro-
gram, it would have to stop accepting new customers. The Ohio
Edison Company showed that further construction deferrals would
result in restriction of service during periods of peak load. Further-
'0 Id., at 5.
" Id.
41 Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co., PUCO Case Nos. 74-760-EL-AIR, 74-813-EL-
AIR (Mar. 5, 1975); Ohio Edison Co., PUCO Case Nos. 73-509-Y, 73-510-Y, 73-847-Y (Feb.
18, 1975); Dayton Power & Light Co., PUCO Case No. 74-238-Y (Jan. 15, 1975); Toledo
Edison Co., PUCO Case Nos. 73-706-Y, 73-905-Y, 73-906-Y (Jan. 15, 1975); Ohio Power Co.,
PUCO Case No. 74-580-Y (Jan. 13, 1975).
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more, each company had minimized operating expenses prior to seek-
ing emergency relief. The Dayton Power and Light Company had
reduced its labor force and instituted a voluntary early retirement
program. It had also instituted cost-control programs, improved its
inventory controls, deferred maintenance expenditures on facilities
not essential for service, reduced advertising, reduced the size of its
transportation fleet, and reduced its charitable contributions. Despite
such measures, costs had risen. The Ohio Power Company showed
that its operating costs had increased more than seventy percent in
two years. In each of these cases the Commission found, as in United,
that emergency rate relief was the only means to insure that the
applicants would be able to arrange necessary financing on reason-
able terms. Accordingly, in each of the five cases, the Commission
granted what it found to be the minimum amount of additional
revenues that would prevent deterioration of the quality of the appli-
cant's services. It also required that each applicant be prepared to
refund with interest any additional amount which the commission
might later find to be unreasonable after considering the evidence in
the applicant's concurrent permanent rate case.
In three other applications filed by two major electric compa-
nies, the applicants alleged that their failure to realize authorized
rates of return had reduced their ability to attract capital investment
and made the acquisition of long-term debt more expensive. In those
cases the Commission found that the Ottoville criteria had not been
met and denied the applications. These decisions included the follow-
ing explanation:
[W]hen considered in light of the financial difficulties facing the
other major electric utilities who have been before the Commission
for emergency relief in recent months, the conditions alleged in this
motion, even if true, do not constitute a pressing need for temporary
rate relief. Applicant is not approaching any legal limitations on its
ability to issue either short or long-term debt, nor is there any
expectation that [it] will be unable to issue stock on realistic terms.
Thus, it is clear that the extraordinary measure of temporary rate
relief is not the only practical mechanism available to applicant to
obtain funds required to continue to provide adequate service. This
has been an absolute requirement in all prior emergency cases and
the Commission finds nothing in the instant motion which would
justify a departure from this well-established precedent."
46 Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., PUCO Case No. 74-845-EL-AIR, at 3 (Apr. 4, 1975);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., PUCO Case No. 75-70-EL-AIR, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1975); Cleveland
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The applicants had also argued that since their rates of return
had fallen below the rates previously approved by the Commission,
the Commission's refusal to grant emergency rate increases would
amount to unconstitutional confiscation of the applicant's property.
In addressing this contention, the commission had occasion to re-
emphasize the essential differences between emergency rate proceed-
ings and permanent rate proceedings.
The fact that the rate of return authorized in a prior case is not now
being realized by a utility does not render the rates presently in
effect confiscatory. The central concept of raterriaking theory con-
templates exactly such a result. The return allowed is calculated
after determining the proper level of allowable annual expenses and
is fixed at a level which will permit the utility to . . carry on its
operations [successfully], assuming economical management. There
is no guarantee that such a rate of return will be realized indefi-
nitely. This provides incentive for management efficiency and is the
essence of proper regulation. No due process safeguards are violated
[simply] because when a utility's operations are [affected] by in-
creasing costs of doing business beyond management's control, the
company is expected to . . . come before this agency [again] for
analysis of its financial condition, which is precisely what this appli-
cant has done through its pending [permanent] application. Thus,
the instant motion [requesting emergency rates] raises the issue
which is, in fact, the heart of the subject matter of the permanent
case.
47
These denials of emergency relief demonstrate the Commission's re-
luctance to increase rates pursuant to its emergency authority unless
the utility's ability to provide adequate service is in imminent jeop-
ardy.
The Commission's policies governing emergency rate relief may
be summarized as follows: A company's percentage rate of return is
not per se an issue in emergency rate proceedings. Whether an exist-
ing rate is confiscatory must be decided under the regular ratemaking
procedures that the legislature has provided for that purpose. A com-
pany's inability to meet its fixed charges or its operating expenses is
grounds for requesting emergency relief, and if the Commission finds
such relief appropriate it will order a rate which will enable the
Elec. Ilium. Co., PUCO Case No. 74-571-Y, at 3 (Apr. 1, 1975).
17 Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., PUCO Case No. 74-845-EL-AIR, at 3-4 (Apr. 4, 1975);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., PUCO Case No. 75-70-EL-AIR, at 3-4 (Apr. 1, 1975); Cleveland
Elec. Ilium. Co., PUCO Case No. 74-571-Y at 3-4 (Apr. .1, 1975).
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company to meet its financial obligations and continue operations
pending its permanent rate application. Even if a company's revenues
cover its fixed charges and operating expenses, it may still have
grounds for requesting an emergency rate if rising costs have eroded
its earnings so as to render impossible the issuance of new debt and
equity on reasonable terms, thus jeopardizing substantially the qual-
ity of utility service. In such a case, if the Commission finds emer-
gency relief appropriate, it will order a rate which will allow the
company to compete for new capital and will protect the quality of
the company's service from further deterioration pending the com-
pany's permanent rate application. These emergency rate-making
standards are now on review before the supreme court in Amherst v.
PUCO48 and Coalition of Concerned Utility Users v. PUCO,45 and
decisions in those cases may affect the Commission's practices.
" Ohio supreme court Docket No. 75-535 (filed June 16, 1975).
" Ohio supreme court Docket No. 75-611 (filed July 7, 1975). As this article went to press,
the supreme court issued its decision in this case. Coalition of Concerned Utility Users v.
PUCO, 45 Ohio St. 2d 151, 341 N.E.2d 839 (1976). The PUCO's order granting emergency
rate relief to the Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company was affirmed.
